Abstract. We consider the problem of ranking distributions of opportunity sets on the basis of equality. First, conditional on a given ranking of individual opportunity sets, we de®ne the notion of an equalizing transformation. Then, assuming that the opportunity sets are ranked according to the cardinality ordering, we formulate the analogues of the notions of the Lorenz partial ordering, equalizing (Dalton) transfers, and inequality averse social welfare functions ± concepts which play a central role in the literature on income inequality. Our main result is a cardinality-based analogue of the fundamental theorem of inequality measurement: one distribution Lorenz dominates another if and only if the former can be obtained from the latter by a ®nite sequence of rank preserving equalizations, and if and only if the former is ranked higher than the latter by all inequality averse social welfare functions. In addition, we characterize the smallest monotonic and transitive extension of our cardinality-based Lorenz inequality ordering.
Introduction
It is well known that the distribution of income aords a useful, but incomplete, means of evaluating social inequities. Indeed, Amartya Sen is very clear on this point:
``An important and frequently encountered problem arises from concentrating on inequality of incomes as the primary focus of attention in the analysis of inequality. The extent of real inequality of opportunities that people face cannot be readily deduced from the magnitude of inequality of incomes, since what we can or cannot do, can or cannot achieve, do not depend just on our incomes but also on the variety of physical and social characteristics that aect our lives and make us what we are.'' Consequently, various authors have suggested that we expand or shift our focus to other indicators of well-being. For example, Rawls (1971) has argued that we should concentrate on the distribution of primary goods such as rights, liberties and social determinants of self-respect. Dworkin (1981) and Roemer (1986) have suggested that we focus on the distribution of resources. And Sen (1980 Sen ( , 1992 has proposed the distribution of freedoms and/or functionings for the same purpose.
The choice of such non-income based welfare criteria, however, brings with it serious diculties regarding the issue of inequality measurement, even after the numerous problems which are likely to be encountered during the process of data collection are satisfactorily resolved. Indeed, the present state of inequality measurement theory provides hardly any method of comparing distributions of such non-instrumental welfare indicators, like basic rights and freedoms. To clarify the nature of the problem, let us refer to such collective determinants of well-being as``opportunities'' and pose the following question: given the preferences of a social planner (or a representative agent of the society) over the set of all relevant opportunity sets, how can we rank dierent distributions of opportunity sets? In particular, which distribution aords the greater degree of equality? 2 The problem of inequality measurement has been studied extensively in the unidimensional case of income inequality. In fact, from the seminal contributions of Kolm (1969) , Atkinson (1970) , Dasgupta et al. (1973) , and Rothschild and Stiglitz (1973) , a minimal consensus has emerged. A ranking of income distributions should be consistent with the Lorenz partial ordering, for this ordering is supported by all inequality averse social evaluation functions, and it is the only ordering which is consistent with the intuition that rank-preserving transfers from rich to poor decrease inequality.
In this paper, we wish to establish analogous results for the multidimensional problem of ranking distributions of opportunity sets. First, to 2 It must be emphasized that the phrase``inequality of opportunity'' is commonly used to describe the extent to which parental background rather than personal characteristics (like talent) determine monetary rewards (cf. Atkinson (1980) , Loury (1981) and Benabou (1995) ). The notion we pursue here is, however, fundamentally dierent than this social mobility related interpretation. We reiterate that, by opportunities, we mean any non-income based indicators of``quality of life'' such as civil and political rights, fundamental freedoms, basic liberties and so on.
distill the problem to its essential form, we con®ne our attention to twoagent case. 3 We then extend the concept of an equalizing (Dalton) transfer to our framework relative to a given ranking of opportunity sets. While in the context of income inequality measurement such a conditional formulation is not necessary, it is so in the context of opportunity inequality measurement. Indeed, whereas it is obvious which agent is richer and which is poorer wheǹ wealth' is measured in terms of incomes, this is certainly not so when we are interested rather in measuring the opportunity inequality. Therefore, to determine from whom an equalizing transfer is going to be made, one has to invoke a certain opportunity set ranking, which might be interpreted either as an individual ranking re¯ecting the preferences of a single representative agent over opportunity sets, or that of a social planner. Whichever the interpretation might be, the chosen opportunity set ordering enables us to de®ne suitable versions of the Lorenz partial ordering and inequality averse social evaluation functions (de®ned relative to the chosen set ordering).
To demonstrate the usefulness of this approach, we consider an extensive example in which opportunity sets are ranked on the basis of their cardinalities. 4 For this case, we establish an analogue of the so-called fundamental theorem of inequality measurement: one distribution of opportunity sets Lorenz dominates another if and only if the former can be obtained from the latter by a ®nite sequence of rank-preserving equalizations, and if and only if the former is ranked higher than the latter by all inequality averse social evaluation functions.
As in the standard theory, our generalization of the Lorenz ordering is well-de®ned only when the set of aggregate opportunities is ®xed. In the case of income inequality, this is easily accommodated by normalizing total income and focusing on relative inequality. Here, however, no such normalization is available, and one must study appropriate extensions of the Lorenz ordering directly. Again using the example of the cardinality-based opportunity set ordering, we demonstrate this procedure by characterizing 3 Two remarks on this concentration are in order. First, an`agent' may also be thought of as a`class' rather than an individual. For example, if e and f are subsets of a given universal set of opportunities, eY f may represent an opportunity distribution of a certain society where e is the opportunity set of women in the population and f is that of men. Second, we stress that the problem is by no means trivial when we restrict our attention to two-agent situations in the present model while it would be trivial in the case of income inequality. 4 For an extensive treatment of the cardinality ordering, we refer the reader to Pattanaik and Xu (1990) where this set ranking is axiomatically studied as an ordering which focuses only on the degree of freedom of choice an opportunity set provides to an agent. (See Sen (1991) and Klemisch-Ahlert (1993) for critical discussions.) While it is clear that con®ning attention to the cardinality ordering is quite restrictive, we note that it is far from trivializing the problem at hand. We maintain here that since we are but at a very preliminary stage of a potential theory of opportunity inequality measurement, it only makes sense to study the problem in its simplest possible form, and seek possible extensions thereafter.
the smallest monotonic and transitive extension of the induced Lorenz ordering.
The paper is organized as follows. In the next section, we review the relevant results of the theory of income inequality measurement and state a fundamental theorem. We also introduce the objects of our analysis, namely, opportunity distributions in this section. In Section 3, conditional on a given ordering of individual opportunity sets, we formulate general notions of rank preserving equalizations, Lorenz orders and inequality averse social evaluation functions. In Sections 4 and 5, we provide a detailed analysis of these notions in the particular case when the opportunity sets are ranked on the basis of their cardinalities. The results obtained in these sections yield an analogue of the fundamental theorem of inequality measurement; see Section 6. Finally, Section 7 is devoted to a study of monotonic and transitive extensions of the Lorenz ordering induced by the cardinality ranking. The paper concludes with identifying an agenda for future research.
Preliminaries

The fundamental theorem of inequality measurement
This subsection contains a brief review of some of the well-known concepts of the theory of inequality measurement. For exhaustive reviews of the topic, we refer the reader to Foster (1985) and Lambert (1993) .
Let R r X ft P R r X t 1 t 2 F F F t r gY r ! 2. The elements of R r are interpreted as the illfare ordered distributions of income among r individuals.
The where, for any t P R r , t t 1 Y t 2 Y F F F Y t r is a permutation of t such that t P R r . The ordinary Lorenz ordering is then de®ned as
R is said to be S-concave (Schur-concave) if it represents ! v in the sense of Richter (1966) ; that is, if, for any xY y P R r , x ! v y implies x ! y X In the context of welfare economics, one usually treats X as an individualistic social welfare (evaluation) function where all individuals have iden-tical preferences with respect to income. 5 For instance, X x U 3 r i1 ux i , where uX is any increasing function on R , is the classical utilitarian social welfare function. If we assume that uX is concave on R , then this welfare function is necessarily S-concave (cf. Atkinson (1970) and Dasgupta et al. (1973) ).
The equalizing (Dalton) transfer operator X R r 3 2 R r is de®ned as x P y if, and only if, there exists an P 0Y x j À x i a2 and iY j P f1Y F F F Y rgY i`j, such that
If x P y, we understand that either x is equal to y or it can be obtained from y by transfering a certain amount of money from a richer individual to a poorer individual such that the relative positions of these individuals remain unchanged. One of the basic premises of the theory of income inequality measurement is to regard x as less unequal than y whenever x P y. A natural extension of this premise is to regard x as less unequal than y if, for some n P N, there exist
and de®ne the ordinary Dalton ordering
r as x ! h y if and only if x P n y for some n ! 1 X
In the terminology of Fields and Fei (1978) , if x ! h y, we understand that either x is equal to y or it can be obtained from y by means of a ®nite sequence of rank preserving equalizations. The main idea goes back to Dalton who noted that``... in comparing two distributions, in which both the total income and the number of income receivers are the same, we may see that one might be able to be evolved from the other by means of a series of transfers of this kind. In such a case we could say with certainty that the inequality of one was less than that of the other'' (Dalton (1920) , p. 351).
The following well-known theorem which is due to Hardy et al. (1934) brings all of these key concepts together in a unifying manner. It is in this sense that we refer to this result as the fundamental theorem of inequality measurement. 5 It is also commonplace in inequality economics to treat an S-concave X as an inequality index which is consistent with the Lorenz ordering (Foster 1985) . 6 For any set e, the power set of e is denoted by 2 e , that is, 2 e X ff X f egX 7 For any correspondence f X on set e, we let f f X Pf f for all f e. 
For extensive discussions and alternative proofs of this theorem, we refer the reader to Dasgupta et al. (1973) , Rothschild and Stiglitz (1973) , Sen (1973) , Fields and Fei (1978) , Marshall and Olkin (1979) and Foster (1985) .
The main purpose of this paper is to study a potential analogue of this famous theorem in the fundamentally dierent framework of opportunity distributions to which we now turn.
The opportunity distributions in a dual economy
Let v stand for a universal set of opportunities, 5v ! 2. In this paper, we view the members of v as the totality of non-income based``quality of life'' indicators such as basic liberties, rights, freedoms, and so on, although other interpretations are possible. For example, v can be thought of as composed of opportunities like the freedom of speech, the freedom from torture, the freedom from religious and political censorship, the right to vote, the right of movement, the freedom from federal coercion, etc. Among other interpretations are certain functionings aÁ la Sen (such as being well-nourished and having self-respect), and access to quality enhancing attributes (such as educational opportunities, fair housing, etc.)
Given this interpretation, we make a number of conceptual assumptions about the nature of the elements of v. First, we assume that every element of v is (weakly) desirable in the sense that providing an individual with a``new'' opportunity (i.e. an element of v that she did not have before) does not reduce her quality of life. Second, we postulate that it is possible to provide all members of the society with any opportunity in v; the members of v are in no way personalized. Moreover, we assume that the opportunities contained in v are non-rivalrous in the sense that providing an opportunity to one agent does not render it unavailable for others. These postulates are, of course, in nature of things when one interprets v as a certain set of rights, freedoms and accesses. For example, the right to vote, the freedom of speech or access to a particular post are all desirable and non-rivalrous opportunities. 8 8 It must be emphasized that these conceptual assumptions are admittedly restrictive; for instance, they rule out the rights the exercise of which could cause external eects on others. Similarly, the scarcity issues are ignored in the present framework. Moreover, our assumptions may indeed be at odds with some particular instances of functionings. For example, since providing a blind person with a functioning like``to visually enjoy a beautiful painting'' is impossible, such an individual is deprived of this particular``opportunity'' by default. The applicability of our abstract framework, therefore, depends critically on the issue of the appropriate equalisandum. We are grateful to a referee for pointing out this issue.
In passing, we note that con®ning attention to desirable and nonrivalrous opportunities identi®es the ®rst-best distribution for the society as universal access for everyone (i.e. as the one in which all agents are allocated the entire v). However, since in most real life situations, we do not observe that everyone enjoys all basic rights and freedoms, and since the universal provision of certain opportunities (like education) are costly, it is still of interest to learn how to measure the extent of departure from this ®rst-best distribution and to rank alternative opportunity distributions accordingly.
Having given our conceptualization of the universal opportunity set v, we de®ne
to be interpreted as the set of all possible opportunity distributions in a twoagent society. As noted above, one may, for instance, think of the members of X as particular distributions of rights, liberties and/or freedoms.
A notion of equalization
Our primary objective in this paper is to devise an``equality'' partial ordering on X which we shall denote by¨. For OY U P X, therefore, we interpret O¨U as``O is at least as equal as U''. Given the nature of the study, the following two properties are rather unexceptionable conditions to posit on¨:
Axiom A.¨is a preorder on X; that is, it is a re¯exive and transitive binary relation on X.
Of course, neither of these axioms capture an essential aspect of the notion of``equality''. It appears then that we have to formulate an analogue of the``principle of equalizing (Dalton) transfers'' of the standard theory to provide further structure for¨. To this end, however, one needs to uncover the basic features of an equalizing operator in the present context, and to do this, in turn, we must have a certain procedure of distinguishing who actually is the``richer'' agent in a given opportunity distribution. What we seek is thus a way of ranking opportunity sets, a problem which received considerable interest after the in¯uential work of Kannai and Peleg (1984) on extending an order on a set to the power set.
Consequently, it appears that a theory of opportunity inequality measurement (which is couched in Dalton's terms) can only be studied conditional upon the given opportunity set ranking. We shall outline the general features of such a theory in the next subsection. The rest of the paper, on the other hand, will be devoted to a detailed study of a particular instance of this approach.
The general case
Let us assume that a particular method of ranking opportunity sets, that is, a complete preorder on 2 v , say , is given. (As usual, the asymmetric and symmetric parts of are denoted by and s, respectively.) By de®nition, lets one rank the well-being levels of individuals with regard to the opportunities available to them, and as in the standard theory, it re¯ects the views of either a representative agent of the society or a social planner. 9 Since it seems quite reasonable to declare an agent``richer'' (or, in a more advantageous situation) if every option that is available to the other party is available to her, the following monotonicity assumption is postulated on :
That is, is assumed to be an extension of the subsethood relation . 10 Of course, this postulate is but a straightforward re¯ection of our conceptual assumption concerning the``desirability'' of opportunities.
Given an opportunity set ranking , we wish to specify a correspondence on X that would map an opportunity distribution U to another distribution O such that O will be deemed``at least as equal as'' U in some unambiguous sense. Without knowing the precise nature of , the exact speci®cation of is, of course, a highly problematic issue. However, some basic properties of such a transformation can be identi®ed even without knowing the speci®cs of . For instance, since such a transformation is, in eect,`mimicking' the equalizing (Dalton) transfer operator de®ned in Subsection 2.1, it is only natural to assume that the totality of the opportunities available in the pretransformation distribution remains unchanged after the transformation takes place. In addition, in accordance with Dalton's perception of equalization, it seems quite reasonable to require that an`equalizing' transformation should make the`poorer' agent (weakly) better o (with respect to ) and the`richer' agent (weakly) worse o (with respect to ) while leaving theranks of the agents intact. These considerations lead us to the next de®nition. 9 One may also think as an extension of the preferences of the social planner (or the representative agent) over v to 2 v in the sense that is weakly preferred to if and only if fgfg for all Y P v. Many interesting examples of such extensions are axiomatically studied in a sister literature. See, inter alia, Barbera and Pattanaik (1984), , Pattanaik and Peleg (1984) , Nitzan and Pattanaik (1984) , Bossert (1989 Bossert ( , 1995 , Pattanaik and Xu (1990) , Klemisch-Ahlert (1993), Bossert et al. (1994) and Puppe (1995 Puppe ( , 1996 . 10 As innocent as it may seem, this is a considerable re®nement, and cannot be expected to be appealing in all relevant contexts. Indeed, a major part of the literature concerning the extensions of an order on a set to the power set uses variants of the GaÈ rdenfors principle as a basic axiom which immediately con®ne the analysis to nonmonotonic relations (cf. Kannai and Peleg (1984) , Barbera (1977) , ). See also Gaertner (1990) for a criticism of this monotonicity assumption from an alternative perspective.
Notation: We de®ne K X fO P X X y 2 y 1 g X That is, K is the class of all two-agent opportunity distributions which are illfare ordered with respect to . De®nition 3.1. An equalizing transformation with respect to R is any nonempty correspondence X K 3 2 K such that, for all U P X such that 2 1 and O P U, y 1 y 2 1 2 Y y 1 1 and 2 y 2 X There may, of course, be many dierent equalizing transformations with respect to a given , and choosing the`right' one is certainly a contextdependent issue which cannot be resolved without knowing the nature of precisely. Even at this level of generality, however, a route towards a theory of opportunity inequality measurement can be identi®ed. Indeed, once an equalizing transformation with respect to a given , say , is chosen, we may de®ne a (Dalton) ordering on X (conditional on and ) which would rank an opportunity distribution O``at least as equal as'' U whenever O can be obtained from U by means of successively applying to U ®nitely many times. A non-recursively de®ned equivalent of this ordering¨could then be considered as a natural analogue of the ordinary Lorenz ordering in the present context. Such an ordering also gives rise to a natural generalization of S-concave functions: any function X X 3 R that represents the derived (non-recursive) equality ordering can be called S-concave with respect to (and ). In other words, De®nition 3.1 has the potential to identify suitable re¯ections of the key notions of the standard inequality measurement theory within our present framework.
Of course, these de®nitions would be quite useful if one could connect them with each other in a way analogous to the fundamental theorem of inequality measurement. Indeed, only after establishing an equivalence result analogous to Theorem 2.1 may we view the induced equality ordering¨in the same spirit with the ordinary Lorenz ordering. Therefore, given , our aim must be to choose the equalizing transformation carefully to obtain an analogue of the fundamental theorem with the induced de®nitions.
In our opinion, this particular outline of a general theory of opportunity inequality measurement is a promising one. While it is simply a sketch at the moment, it clearly identi®es a concrete research agenda, and seems to be thè right' ®rst step towards a theory of opportunity inequality measurement. Yet what may or may not be achieved in this framework is certainly not clear; the question of whether or not one can obtain an opportunity inequality measurement theory in the same spirit as the income inequality measurement theory for a least one opportunity ranking method is open. In what follows, we shall demonstrate that the answer to this question is armative, and hence that the proposed theory has potential.
The case of the cardinality ordering
In this subsection, we shall study the general approach sketched above in the case of the simplest non-trivial opportunity set ranking, namely the cardinality ordering, 5 , which is de®ned on 2 v as e 5 f if and only if 5e ! 5fX
Of course, 5 hardly provides a compelling way of ranking opportunity sets. 11 As noted in the introduction, we maintain rather that it is reasonable to focus on an analytically tractable set ordering like 5 at this very preliminary stage. The exercise we undertake here should therefore be viewed as only ®rst step of an analysis which may eventually be carried over to more useful (and complicated) opportunity set rankings along the lines described in Subsection 3.1.
Let K X K 5 and de®ne 5 X K 3 2 K as follows:
Notice that since the range of 5 is 2 K , the transfers embodied in 5 X do not alter the 5 -ranks of the agents. 12 Therefore, it is readily veri®ed that 5 is an equalizing transformation with respect to 5 .
To see why 5 is a suitable equalizing transformation with respect to 5 , let U P X and suppose that 5 2 b 5 1 . Clearly, this means that the second agent is strictly``richer'' than the ®rst one according to the ranking 5 . Consequently, the equalizing transformation 5 expands the opportunity set of agent 1, and since 1 2 is ®xed, such an expansion must come from 2 n 1 . Therefore, in the case, 5 makes the``poorer'' agent richer and leaves the``richer'' agent equally rich. 13 If, on the other hand, 5 1 5 2 , then both agents are equally rich (again according to 5 ), and making the distribution more equal requires making the sets 1 and 2 more``similar''. Thus, an equalization results by adding to the opportunity set of the ®rst agent an opportunity x P 2 n 1 and that of the second agent an opportunity 11 As noted earlier, Sen (1991) and Klemisch-Ahlert (1993) provide critical discussions about the cardinality ordering. It appears that the major shortcoming of this ordering is due to the fact that it is essentially independent of the underlying preferences of the agents. Indeed, as shown by Pattanaik and Xu (1990), 5 is the only strictly monotonic opportunity set ranking which satis®es a strong independence condition and which declares all the singleton sets indierent. (See also Puppe (1995) .) 12 By convention, we let U fUg whenever 1 2 for any equalizing transformation T. 13 We stress that this operation provides the``poorer'' agent with an additional opportunity, previously held by the``richer'' agent, without shrinking the opportunity set of the``richer'' agent. Of course, such an operation makes sense only if the opportunities are not personalized and are non-rivalrous. Consequently, we note that our equalization notion is in accordance with the conceptual assumptions we made about the members of v in Subsection 2.2.
y P 1 n 2 . If, on the other hand, 1 2 , an equalization cannot take place, for the initial distribution is already perfectly egalitarian.
An interesting feature of 5 is that it brings two distinct criteria of`e quality'' together. First of all, if an agent is strictly poorer than the other (with respect to 5 ), 5 transforms the distribution so as to close the gap between the poorer and richer agents while preserving the rank orders of them. Moreover, this operation results in a distribution where the agents' opportunity sets are more similar in the sense that they have a larger fraction of common elements. If, on the other hand, agents start o equally rich (with respect 5 ), then the equalization embodied in 5 consists of only increasing the fraction of common opportunities between the agents for there is no gap in welfare (as measured by 5 ) to begin with.
It is important to note that the notion of equalization modelled by the operator 5 is strongly connected to our choice of opportunity set ordering. Indeed, as the following remark demonstrates, analogous formulations of 5 for other ranking criteria may run into both analytical and conceptual dif®culties.
Remark. (1) Take any preorder R on v. The cardinality-®rst R-lexicographic ordering Ã on X is de®ned as e Ã f if, and only if, 5e b 5f or 5e 5f and VxY y P maxe Â maxf X x R y where max denotes the R-gretest elements of for any v (cf. Bossert et al. (1994) ). By analogy with the de®nition of 5 , one might consider de®ning an equalizing transformation
This de®nition, however, entails serious diculties with regard to the measurement exercise. To illustrate, let v fY Y g with P R , and consider the opportunity distribution U fgY fY g. (P is, of course, the asymmetric factor of R.) Clearly, we have Ã U Y, which means that, given the data of the example, we can never obtain a distribution from U by an equalization. For instance, the perfectly egalitarian opportunity distribution vY v can never be reached from U by means of any number of equalizations. Put dierently, an equality ordering which can be induced by Ã recursively (recall the ordinary Dalton ordering of Subsection 2.1), would exhibit a rather troubling incompleteness in that it could not order U and vY v. ( 2) The following example illustrates that measuring opportunity inequality on the basis of preference relation R and on the basis of``similarity'' of sets 14 Needless to say, one does not run into a similar problem with the operator 5 . Indeed, 5 U ffY gY fY gY fY gY fY gg and 5 O fvY vg for all O P 5 U.
(as measured by the symmetric dierence) may well be in con¯ict. Again let v fYYg with P R , and consider the opportunity distribution U fgY fY g along with any monotonic opportunity set ranking such that fg s fY g. The basic premise behind the equalizing transformation 5 is that the distribution O fY gY fY Y g is at least as equal as U, for the opportunity sets in O have a large fraction of common elements than those in U. Yet, since we assume that all opportunities are desirable, there is an obvious sense in which O is strictly less unequal than U. 15 As observed in footnote 13, this sort of a diculty would not arise when we con®ne attention to 5 for some n ! 1 X In the next two sections, we shall proceed along the main line of the general approach described in the preceding section, and study the equality ordering¨h 5 in detail. The present section concludes with the following observation which is readily veri®ed. Proposition 3.3.¨h 5 is the smallest binary relation on X which satis®es Axioms AY B and CX
The Lorenz ordering induced by 5
As noted earlier, in view of De®nition 3.2 and the equivalence of the statements (i) and (ii) in Theorem 2.1, there is a natural way of formulating an analogue of the celebrated Lorenz ordering in the present context by requiring it to be a non-recursive equivalent of¨h 5 . In other words, we have The (weak) Lorenz ordering induced by 5 is de®ned as
We stress that 1 L # is not the ordinary strict Lorenz ordering simply applied to the cardinality distributions. To illustrate, let Y Y P v, and consider U fgYfYYg and O fY gY fY g. Clearly, We only examine the ®rst case, the others being entirely similar. The hypotheses 1 2 y 1 y 2 and i y i Y i 1Y 2Y together imply that 
16 But then, since 2 5 1 ,
nÀm U Y and since 1 s 5 2 , 16 By convention, we let fy For any binary relation¨on X, we denote the set of¨-greatest,¨-maximal,¨-least, and¨-minimal elements of X by q¨Y g¨Y v¨ and ¨, respectively. 17 Our next proposition computes the greatest, maximal, least and minimal elements of X with respect to the Lorenz ordering induced by 5 .
Proposition 4.4. Let 5v ! 2. Then,
Proof. De®ne, for any U P X, AU X fO P X X y 1 y 2 1 2 g X Fix an arbitrary U P X and notice that if O T P AU, then O and U are noẗ L 5 -connected. This readily establishes (i). On the other hand, (ii) immediately follows from the fact that,
For any¨& X Â X, we de®ne q¨ X fO P X X VU P X X O¨Ug and g¨ X fO P X X VU P X X U¨O A U OgX v¨ and ¨ are de®ned dually.
Finally, to see (iii), let U YY 2 P X and notice that, for any O P X,
S 5 -concavity
We now turn our attention to welfare related properties of¨L 5 . The following de®nition formulates the concept of inequality averse social welfare (evaluation) functions in our setting.
De®nition 5.1. X X 3 R is said to be S 5 -concaveY ifY for any OY U P XY O¨L 5 U implies O ! UX The set of all 5 -concave functions is denoted by S 5 X
That is, an S 5 -concave social welfare function is the one which never records a decrease in collective welfare when an inequality reducing redistribution (as measured by¨L 5 ) takes place. Of course, one may also interpret an S 5 -concave X as any opportunity inequality index de®ned on X in a way consistent with the Lorenz ordering induced by 5 . In either case, the analogy with the familiar notion of S-concavity is straightforward.
The following lemma provides some examples of S 5 -concave functions for further reference.
Lemma 5.2. Let a X v 3 R be any function and u X 0Y 1 3 R be any concave function. The following functions on X are 5 -concave:
Proof. That the functions given in (1) are S 5 -concave follows immediately from the hypothesis that a b 0 for all P v. To see the second assertion, ®x a concave u X 0Y 1 3 R and let O 1 L 5 U. As noted in Subsection 2.1, the concavity of u implies the S-concavity of xY y U 3 ux uy, and hence, either 5y 1 5y 2 or 5 1`5 y 1`5 y 2 5 2 (and these are the only possibilites) so that
To prove the ®nal proposition, let O 1 L 5 U again, and observe that the assertion is trivial when 5y 1 5y 2 and
The next lemma is a crucial step towards our main theorem.
Lemma 5.3. If OY U P X and
Notation. Given m ! 2, we write e 1 e 2 F F F e m for m i1 e i whenever every two distinct sets in the collection fe 1 Y F F F Y e m g are disjoint.
Proof of Lemma 5.3. By Lemma 5.2,
Therefore, by Lemma 2.1 of Klemisch-Ahlert (1993), we must have
To prove the second assertion, de®ne, for any O P X O 5y 1 y 2 and À O À5y 1 y 2 X One can easily check that both X and À X are 5 -concave. Therefore, if (4) holds for OY U P X, we must have 5y 1 y 2 5 1 2 , that is 5y 1 5y 2 À 5y 1 y 2 5 1 5 2 À 5 1 2 so that
Now, since i y i , i 1Y 2, we may write y 1 1 e and y 2 2 f Y 6
for some eY f P 2 v . Let
(We wish to show that Y.) Let 1 e and 2 f. Let us ®rst establish the following
Proof of claim. That 1 2 e f is immediate from the de®nitions. Also recall that 1 e 2 f Y so that 1 2 e f Y. Therefore, e f and the claim follows.
Now, by (6), 5y 1 5e 5 1 and 5y 2 5f 5 2 Y and combining this with (5), 5e 5f 5y 1 y 2 À 5 1 2 X
7
On the other hand, one can easily verify that y 1 y 2 e f 2 e 1 f 1 2 and thus, by the claim above,
Hence, by (7) 5e 5f 5 2 e 5 1 f 5 1 2 Y that is 5e À 5 2 e 5f À 5 1 f 5 1 2 Y which yields
But, by de®nition of 1 and 2 , 1 2 en 2 and 1 2 fn 1 so that (8) cannot hold unless 5 1 2 0. On the other hand, 5 1 2 0 implies that 5en 2 5fn 1 0, that is, en 2 Y and fn 1 Y, and in view of (6), this yields that y 1 y 2 1 2 . Since we have already shown that i y i , i 1Y 2Y it follows that y 1 y 2 1 2 also holds, and hence the proof. ( The following theorem is the main result of this section.
Theorem 5.4. For any O, U P X, we have
Proof. Necessity follows from the de®nition of 5 -concavity. To prove suf®ciency, let OY U P X such that O T U and (2) and (9), we have
UY for all concave u X 0Y 1 3 R X By a well-known result due to Hardy et al. (1934) , p. 89, we must then have
Therefore, since 5 1 5 2 would contradict this observation, we conclude that 5 1`5 2 .
We now wish to establish that 1 & y 1 and 2 y 2 . By (10) (9), and thus we conclude that 2 y 2 which, in turn, establishes that O 1 L # UX (
A benchmark result
In the previous sections, we have con®ned our attention to two-agent societies where the preferences of the society (or of the representative agent) over the attributes in v are represented by the cardinality ordering, and attempted to formulate the counterparts of a number of key concepts of the theory of income inequality measurement in this admittedly restrictive framework. Our formulations take the forms reported in De®nitions 3.2, 4.1 and 5.1. The merit of these formulations is, of course, that they allow us to establish an equivalence theorem which is analytically analogous to the fundamental theorem of inequality measurement in the present framework. Indeed, our development culminates in Theorems 4.2 and 5.4, and these yield the following benchmark result the spirit of which undoubtedly accords with Theorem 2.1. Theorem 6.1. Let OY U P X. The following statements are equivalent:
Theorem 6.1 demonstrates that the general approach we sketched in Subsection 3.1 towards a theory of opportunity inequality measurement has some potential. At least in the case of the simplest non-trivial opportunity set ranking method 5 , we are able to obtain an equality ordering which is reminiscent of the standard Lorenz ordering in a number of formal aspects. It will of course be very interesting to see if an equivalence result like Theorem 6.1 can be obtained with suitably de®ned versions of Dalton and Lorenz orderings induced by other opportunity set orderings than 5 . This important inquiry is, however, left for future research.
Although equivalence proportions like Theorem 6.1 are extremely useful for a potential theory, they are nevertheless of little use in determining how incomplete the proposed equality ordering is. If, for instance, all that such a result provides is an equality ordering which can order the opportunity distributions only with respect to the perfectly egalitarian and completely inegalitarian distributions, one can hardly view this equality ordering as a useful one. Equivalence results which`mimic' the fundamental theorem of inequality measurement, therefore, should be considered only as a foundation upon which various extensions (or completions) might be constructed. To demonstrate, we provide one such investigation below where we turn our attention to issues related to the extent of incompleteness of¨L # . This exercise is also likely to be useful in obtaining interesting extensions of the equality orderings induced by opportunity set rankings other than 5 .
Monotonic extensions of¨L #
As an indication that¨L # is too incomplete, we observe its inability of comparing perfectly egalitarian distributions. For example, the opportunity distributions fg, fg and fY g, fY g, Y P v, cannot be ranked bÿ L# , although it is intuitively clear that these distributions are equally unequal since both of them are perfectly egalitarian. Indeed, the following axiom seems unexceptionable.
Axiom D. Let O P X and y 1 y 2 . Then, O¨U for all U P X.
Although¨L # does not satisfy Axiom D, we can extend it in a trivial way to solve the problem:
is an extension of¨L 5 which allows us to conclude that a perfectly egalitarian distribution is less unequal than any other distribution. Consequently,
Moreover, F L 5 satis®es Axioms A, B and C. Nevertheless, we contend that F L 5 is still too incomplete.
One of the axioms introduced in Kranich (1996) , namely monotonicity, is quite appealing:
Let O P X. If y 1 y 2 then the second agent is clearly enjoying greater opportunities than the ®rst one. Monotonicity axiom says that if the second agent's opportunity set expands further, the degree of inequality should increase. While this is quite a reasonable requirement it is easy to see that F L 5 is not monotonic. Before we attempt to remedy this shortcoming, however, let us ®rst clarify that this result is far from unexpected.
Consider the following income distributions of a two-person society: z 1Y 10 and w 1Y 15. Which distribution is more unequal? Presumably, a unanimous answer would be that z is more equal than w. However, the Lorenz ordering does not capture this clear intuition; zY w, wY z T P ! v , for z 1 z 2 T w 1 w 2 . We have an analogous situation in the present context. Let 5v ! 3, O fgY fY g and U fgY fY Y g. Observe that OY U, UY O T P F L 5 , and this is precisely because y 1 y 2 T 1 2 . Consequently, if we are after an analogue of the standard Lorenz ordering in our framework of the measurement of opportunity inequality, that our candidate preorder is not monotonic is hardly surprising.
How do we deal with cases like comparing z 1Y 10 and w 1Y 15 in the standard theory? The most common way is to invoke the axiom of scale invariance (which asserts that x $ kx, for all x P R That¨M L 5 is the equality ordering we are after should be clear. Indeed, it lets us rank fg, fY g and fg, fY Y g certainly in accordance with our intuition:
The transitivity of¨M L 5 is proved next. Proof. That¨M L 5 is the smallest monotonic extension of F L 5 is obvious; all we have to show is that it is also transitive. Let We would like to argue that¨M L 5 is still to incomplete. Consider the opportunity distributions O fg, fY g and U YY fY Y g. To conclude that O is``at least as equal as'' U is clearly in nature of things. However, OY U T P¨M L 5 . This observation leads us to consider the following strengthening of Axiom E: Axiom F. (5-Monotonicity) For all OY U P X, 5y 1 5y 2 , 1 y 1 , and
Our ®nal task is, therefore, to study the 5-monotonic extensions of F L 5 . Of course, one immediate way to do this is to de®ne 
However, there is a rather serious problem with this extension; it is not transitive:
We conclude that F L 5 1 M 5 is not transitive. ( Example 7.3 suggests that we should rather study larger 5-monotonic extensions of F L 5 , or more precisely, that we should focus on transitive extensions of F L 5 1 M 5 . Any transitive and 5-monotonic extension of F L 5 is not, however, presumably suitable for our purposes, for such an extension may very well lead us to make unintended comparisons. In other words, one would like to ®nd an extension of F L 5 which respects only the properties of 5-monotonicity and transitivity. An arbitrary 5-monotonic and transitive extension of F L 5 , after all, might respect some additional properties which may not be desirable. Consequently, we need to focus on the smallest 5-monotonic and transitive extension of F L 5 . (In other words, our next task is to obtain the transitive closure of F L 5 1 M 5 .)
To ®nd the smallest transitive and 5-monotonic extension of F L 5 , we shall ®rst brie¯y digress on order theory. Let be an arbitrary set and let P be the class of all transitive relations on . De®ne the function Ã P 2 3 2 as
Let us now turn back to our main topic and state the following 
Conclusion
In our opinion there is a clear need for a more extensive analysis of inequality than on the basis of income dierences alone. In particular, the opportunities available to an individual, such as civil and political liberties, basic rights, freedoms, so on, appear to be complementary determinants of his or her well-being. Although there seems to be an agreement among welfare economists on this issue, the state of the theory of inequality measurement falls signi®cantly short of providing rigorous procedures for evaluating the``inequality'' of such non-income based welfare indicators.
In this paper, we have tried to formulate a (hopefully) promising start of a potential theory of opportunity inequality measurement by demonstrating that it is possible to devise a rigorous measurement theory in the (admittedly restrictive) framework of two-agent societies where the opportunity sets are evaluated in terms of their cardinalities. Our development parallels the theory of income inequality measurement, and culminates in establishing a result which is analytically analogous to the fundamental theorem of inequality measurement. Analogues of the familiar notions of the Lorenz ordering and S-concave social evaluation functions are formulated, and the smallest monotonic and transitive extension of our cardinality-based Lorenz ordering is characterized.
Our study provides a straightforward research agenda: ®rst, to generalize our main result (Theorem 6.1) to n-person societies; second, to generalize Theorem 6.1, if at all possible, to an arbitrary ordering of the individual sets of opportunities along the lines discussed in Subsection 3.1; third, to investigate more complete orderings that are consistent with the Lorenz ranking induced by the chosen opportunity set ordering. These will be the subject of future research.
